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behalf of such an extension, the SEC urged that directors might be tempted to
delay the reorganization or liquidation of a losing concern to gain time in which
to purchase obligations and that delays might waste assets rightfully belonging
to all creditors. Judge Learned Hand's dissent in the court of appeals argued
that "[t]he insolvent company may have a good chance of effecting a composition: that is, it may be able to scale down its debts and go on,"4 and that courts
should ask, in each case, whether the alternatives to "scale down and go on" or
to buy at discount and realize a profit are sufficiently present to require the
trustee rule against divided loyalty. 43 In refusing to extend the trust rule, the
Court adopted Judge Hand's approach to the problem since it limited its decision to the particular facts and suggested another result in Chapter X proceedings should the SEC, as "statutory advisor to the court" present a convincing
"body of evidence.., presumably informed by expert understanding."
The Court's refusal recognizes that the trust rule is based on speculation as
to causes and effects of conflicting considerations and that earlier courts may
have been too deaf to argument in behalf of the director. Looked upon as a realization that recent federal regulations and bankruptcy cases have lessened the
dangers of divided loyalty, perhaps the decision portends further restrictions on
the application of the trust rule as protections against "insider" transactions are
strengthened. Analogous safeguards on the state level leading to similar limitations of the rule will prove of greater significance, however, since the discount
purchase problem is peculiar to small corporations controlled by state regulation
and jurisprudence.
YOUTH CORRECTION-THE MODEL ACT IN OPERATION
I
Though vengeance was, historically, the motive for criminal punishment,'
modern justifications are based on the prevention of future crimes.2 Punishment,
142 F.2d 91,
(C.A. 6th, 1944). In re Jersey Materials Co., 5o F. Supp. 428 (N.J., 1943), was a case of
competition with the corporation in making the purchases and thus stood on grounds alternative to the trust rationale. In In re Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 46 F. Supp. 77 (Calif.,
194i), the claims were purchased after a resolution approving reorganization proceedings and
in In re Norcor Mfg. Co., io9 F. 2d 407 (C.A. 7th, 394o), cert. den. 310 U.S. 625 (1946), the
corporation was in state receivership at the time of purchase.
42r73 F. 2d 944, 952 (C.A. 2d, 1949).
43A similar attitude is revealed by the Chenery cases, 318 U.S. 8o (1943), which held that

tioned in the opinion, but was recited in Gochenour v. Cleveland Buildings Co.,
992

equity (i.e., common law) had not imposed upon officers and directors any fiduciary duty to
shareholders precluding them from buying and selling corporate stock even during reorganization proceedings. But the Court, in 332 U.S. 194 (z947), conceded the SEC's ability to impose
such a rule in the light of its experience.
xWaite, The Prevention of Repeated Crime 3-89 (1943); Waite, The Youth Correction
Authority Act, 9 Law & Contemp. Prob. 6oo, 6oo-602 (1942).
'Tbid. This is not to say that the punitive element is not present in modern theories, for
in all probability, the desire for retribution is consciously or unconsciously always a motiva-
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it has been said, serves to reform the offender, deprive him of the opportunity to
do mischief, and serves to deter other potential criminals.3 Although there is no
general disagreement on the proposition that crime and delinquency either
should be prevented, or if not prevented, attacked when manifestations first
appear, there is increasing doubt that punishment is the proper and desirable
method to achieve these objectives.4
The causes of crime are external pressures affecting both offenders and nonoffenders, and lower resistance of offenders to withstand these pressures.S Criminal law and penology cannot hope to reduce the external pressures, but can
hope to influence the individual's reaction to them. It is felt by many that punitive measures not only fail to develop the capacity for law-abiding conduct and
self support, but have the opposite effect on the plastic and impressionable
youth offender. 6 Specifically, the objections to present methods are that (i) mass
treatment too often subjects convicts of correctible character to destructive influences, (2) individuals are released and subjected to these external pressures
without any societal help or encouragement, and (3) too often individuals are
discharged from incarceration without regard to their fitness or the safety of

society.7
The present uncertainty in regard to the proper function of the punitive and
reformative aspects of imprisonment has unusually serious consequences in the
case of the youthful offender. Recent studies indicate that the youth groupthe age group comprising individuals from sixteen to twenty years-commits
crimes of a serious nature at a rate which is vastly above its percentage of the
total population.8 Furthermore, meager data concerning recidivism indicates
tion. Even under youth correction legislation retaliation is present; the fact that the offender
is to be subjected to criminal prosecution and subsequently is to be under the control of
the state is indicative. The advocacy of correctional methods in this article is not intended
to imply that the element of punishment or retribution is absent. Rather it is an advocacy
of a method of treatment which looks forward to the time when offenders are returned to
society; a method which, although recognizing the presence and drive for retaliation, will protect society from future harm. Although both elements are present, the desire for retaliation by necessity must play a secondary role.
3 People v. Superintendent Illinois State Reformatory, 148 Ill. 413, 421, 36 N.E. 76, 79
(r894).
4 Waite, The Prevention of Repeated Crime z8-32 (1943); Waite, The Youth Correction
Authority Act, 9 Law & Contemp. Prob. 6oo, 602-6o3 (1942); Sellin, Youth and Crime, 9 Law
& Contemp. Prob. 581, 582 (r942).
5 Waite, The Prevention of Repeated Crime 28 (x943); Waite, The Youth Correction
Authority Act, 9 Law & Contemp. Prob. 6oi, 6o9 (1942); Sellin, The Criminality of Youth 70
(1940).
6 MacCormick, Existing Provision for the Correction of Youthful Offenders, 9 Law & Con-

temp. Prob. 588, 589 (1942); Waite, The Youth Correction Authority Act, 9 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 6or, 6o9-614 (1942); Waite, The Prevention of Repeated Crime, 18-32 (z943); Sellin,
The Criminality of Youth 69-94 and tables therein (194o).
7 Sellin, op. cit. supra note 6.
8 Sellin, The Criminality of Youth 1i-67 and tables therein (i94o); Sellin, Youth and
Crime, 9 Law & Contemp. Prob. 581, 582-83 (1942); A.L.I., Youth in Crime 7 (1940). If
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that the youth group demonstrates a high index of repeated crime.9
As a result of these objections, the American Law Institute's Committee on
Uniform Laws developed and presented a Model Youth Correction Authority
Act in i94o.10 The Act was designed to deal with the youth offender after conviction, and was a radical departure from prevailing practices. With the exception of life imprisonment, death or fines, the trial judge was to have no discretion in sentencing a youthful offender (those who were apprehended before attaining the age of twenty-one)." If, under the facts, none of the exceptions was
applicable, the judge was to commit the offender to the Youth Correction Authority.12 After commitment, the Authority was to make a detailed study of
each individual and was to have wide discretion in regard to treatment, segregation and classification.'3
No definite period of control was contemplated, for in line with the purpose
of the Act, the Authority was to have the power to discharge the individual
when treatment and correction had been completed and when discharge would
not constitute a danger to the public. However, discharge of the offender was
required at the time he reached certain age limits unless the Authority felt that
such a discharge would be dangerous to the public.r4 If the Authority was convinced that a discharge would be dangerous, it was to apply for extended control for a period of five years.x The determination of the need for extended control was to be subject to the safeguard of judicial approval of the petition after
full hearing.16 The Authority could reapply for extended control at the end of
each five-year period. The effect of these provisions resulted in giving the
Authority the possibility of perpetual, indeterminate control7 over the individual.
law violations in general are considered, the data indicate that youths do not contribute an
extraordinary amount. However, when the more serious crimes are considered, youth plays an
unusually heavy role. Crimes against property-those with an economic basis-are committed
by the youth group at a very high rate. They commit approximately 5o0% of all automobile
thefts, 4o% of all burglaries, 28% of all robberies, and 22% of all thefts. These figures are
striking in that youths comprise but 13% of the population old enough to commit crimes.
9 Sellin, The Criminality of Youth io6 etseq. (1940); Sellin,Youth and Crime,9 Law & Contemp. Prob. 58z, 584 (1942). It is interesting to note that the types of crime committed by
youth-those against property-are definitely related to recidivism.
10Youth Correction Authority Act (A.L.I. Official Draft, i94o).
ixIbid., at §§ 4-IO, 13.
1Ibid.
"3Tbid., at § 3o. The Authority was to have at its disposal the services of psychiatrists and
psychologists; it could discharge the offender immediately or place him on a type of parole;
it could send him to a vocational camp, to school or to a general rehabilitative institution
in which varied vocational, educational and recreational activities were to be offered.
X4Ibid., at § 29.
"SIbid., at §§ 33-36.
6Ibid.
'7 Indeterminate sentence is used here to mean the power to retain control over an offender
for an indeterminate period of time, provided, of course, that judicial approval of extended
control is obtained. The indeterminate sentence is most commonly applied to the procedure
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The Model Act, which was not received without adverse criticism,s was pre-

sented ten years ago. Since that time the states of California, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Texas, and Wisconsin have adopted similar or related acts. 9 Attempts to pass such legislation in Illinois have been fruitless. In all probability,
the objections to youth correction legislation have come from the judges who
are jealous of any attempts to restrict their judicial power, the lawyers who are
wary of the constitutionality of such legislation, the local communities who fear
a decrease of activity on the local level, and finally, general apathy. It is felt
that a discussion of youth correction legislation is pertinent again today because
of the success which has been achieved by those states which have adopted such
acts and because of the need for such legislation in Illinois. The remainder of
this note will investigate the operation, achievements, and defects of the presently prevailing statutes, and finally will discuss the applicability of youth correction legislation to Illinois criminal law administration.
The various statutes which have been adopted resemble the Model Act to a
great extent, but all of them differ in certain vital respects. In all probability,
the provision in the Model Act for true indeterminate control was one of the
most crucial measures with which to protect society and rehabilitate the offender.20 It was this provision that went directly to the heart of the philosophy
underlying the Act, since the time limits for completion of rehabilitative treatment cannot be determined in advance. None of the acts which have been
adopted have retained this provision. It is highly possible that the reasons for
this omission were fear that passage of legislation containing a provision tantamount to perpetual control would not be obtained, and that even if passed, the
Act's provision for indeterminate control would violate constitutional prohibiof sentencing a criminal for a definite minimum and maximum. The determination of control
and release is to be made by parole and related boards. The term is also applied to the sentencing
procedure in Illinois. Here, however, the judge may set the minimum and maximum, as long
as these termini are within statutory limits. The evil of this practice is apparent, since a
criminal may be sentenced to a minimum of life and a maximum of life and the sentence still
will comply with legal requirements. See Ill. Rev. Stat. (1949) c. 38, § 802; Blackiston, Previous Criminal Records and the Indeterminate Sentence, 76 Crim. Justice 27, 33 (1948), §§ 2731; Healy, Youth Correction: Principles of Diagnosis, Treatment, and Prognosis, 9 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 681 (1942).
is See Perkins, Indeterminate Control of Offenders: Arbitrary and Discriminatory, 9
Law &Contemp. Prob. 625 (1942); N.Y. Times § i, p. 12, col. 6-7 (Mar. '3, 1943); Perkins,
Defect in Youth Correction Authority Act, 33 J. Crim. L. & Criminology i1 (1942); Hall,
The Youth Correction Authority Act, 28 A.B.A.J. 317 (1942). The majority of these objections are dealt with in I1, I1, and IV.
'9 Cal. Wel. & Inst. Code (Deering, r944) §§ 1701 et seq.; Mass. Ann. Laws (Supp. 1948)
c. 11g, §§ 52 et seq., c. 120; Minn. Stat. (Mason, x947) § 26o.x25; Texas Ann. Rev. Civ.
Stat. (Vernon, Supp. r949) art. 5i43C; Wis. Stat. (Brossard, 1947) c. 54.
20 Bennett, Indeterminate Control of Offenders: Realistic and Protective, 9 Law & Con-

temp. Prob.

6,7

(1942).
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tions against "cruel and unusual punishment." 21 These constitutional provisions, however, have been construed very liberally and courts have seldom interfered with legislative discretion in fixing the sentence for a particular crime."
It is not uncommon for courts to state that cruel and unusual punishment is
that which approaches immoral, barbaric or uncivilized conduct.23 In light of
this, one can but wonder about the fears of the legislators. It must be emphasized that it is cruel and unusual punishment which is prohibited; it justifiably
can be argued that such prohibitions do not apply to the philosophy and provisions of youth correction legislation. 2 4 The draftsmen of the Model Act were
motivated by a dissatisfaction and distrust of punishment as a method of preventing repeated crime; it would seem that an application of the prohibitions
against cruel and unusual punishment to this therapeutic legislation would be
inherently self-contradictory. However, as long as many judges and legislators
conceive of the disposition of a convicted offender as punishment, one cannot
wholly condemn the proponents of youth correction acts for intentionally omitting a provision for true indeterminate control.
Not all of the states which have adopted youth correction acts have completely abandoned provision for continued control beyond a set period. Some of
the states have adopted a method by which the Authority is empowered to extend the period of control in cases of individuals who suffer from mental deficiencies or disorders short of insanity, who would constitute a danger to the public.2s
The rationale here, in all probability, is similar to that underlying the detention
of individuals of the "Typhoid Mary" class. 6 The possibility of extended control on this basis is accompanied by elaborate provisions for judicial determination of the necessity for further control.27 It is difficult to understand the dis21 Calif. Const. Art. i, § 6; Mass. Const. Art. 26; Minn. Const. Art. i, § 5; Tex. Const.
Art. i, § 13; Wis. Const. Art. i, § 6.

"State

v. McCauley, i5 Cal. 430 (i86o); In re O'Shea, ii Cal. App. 568, io5 Pac. 776

(i9o9). The Illinbis Constitution states, "All penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of
the offense.. . ." (IlI. Const. Art. II, § ii). This also has been given an exceedingly broad
interpretation. See People v. Landers, 329 Ill. 453, 16o N.E. 836 (1927); People v. Callicott,
322 fI1. 390, 153 N.E. 688 (1926); People v. Elliott, 272 I1. 592, 112 N.E. 3oo (i916).

State v. McCauley, i5 Cal. 43o (i86o); People v. Elliott, 272 I1.592,112 N.E.3oo (i916).
Mimms, Indeterminate Control of Youth Offenders Under the Youth Correction Authority Act: Constitutional Issues, 9 Law & Contemp. Prob. 635, 64r (1942). Furthermore it is
hardly fair to classify the possibility of perpetual control as cruel and unusual since judicial
safeguards would surround the determination of the need for extended control; the individual
is protected against arbitrary action. Youth Correction Authority Act (Official Draft, 1940)
'

'4

§§ 33-34 (2).

2sMass. Ann. Laws (Supp. 1948) c.

120, §§ r7-i9; Wis. Stat. (Brossard, 1947) c. 54,
54.32-54, 34.
"Illinois has provision for the commitment of those who are adjudged sexual psychopaths. Ill. Rev. Stat. (1948) c. 38, § 82o et seq. However the rationale here is not only
protection of the public per se, but also prevention of the prosecution of individuals for crimes
committed when in this condition. People v. Simis, 382 111. 472,47 N.E. 2d 703 ('943).

§

27

Note 25 supra.
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tinction between extended control on this basis and extended control over those
who are merely considered dangerous to the public. Theoretically, the standard
of physical or mental abnormality could be construed as synonymous to that
contemplated in the Model Act, for those who are considered dangerous to the
public vary from the norm and in this sense are "abnormal or deficient." Practically, however, there should be no doubt that the standard of abnormality
will be construed narrowly; definite objective evidence of abnormality will be
demanded. Thus, those states which have chosen this method of extended control have effectively rejected the merits of extended control, for by and large the
great number of offenders over whom the Authority should have extended control are not those who are objectively and definitely "abnormal."
Other states have provided for extended control by another and quite dissimilar method. It is provided that if the Authority determines that discharge
at the end of the statutory period would be dangerous, the Authority can petition the court. If the court finds that discharge would be dangerous, it is not to
grant extended control to the Authority, but must commit the individual to a
penitentiary for a period of time equal to the maximum term prescribed by law
for the offense for which he was originally convicted, less the period during which
he was under the control of the Authority. 8 Apparently this commitment is not
a resentencing but a transfer of control under the original sentence, and it seems
that the individual will be eligible for parole, and in all respects treated as other
prisoners. This method is contingent on the fact that the time spent under the
control of the Authority is less than the maximum sentence prescribed by law;
if such is not the case, he must be discharged in accordance with the statutory
limits. These statutes have provided for protection from the discharge of dangerous offenders and are meritorious in this respect. But it is very possible that
28 Cal. Wel. and Inst. Code (Deering, 1944) §§ 178o-83. Minnesota has a somewhat different solution, but the manner of extended control is based on the maximum sentence idea. The
offender is to be discharged on his twenty-fifth birthday except when the Commission determines that discharge would be dangerous to the public. In such cases the Commission is to
then terminate control in the following manner: "(i) If he be then on probation under the
supervision of the probation officer of the district court, the future control and disposition of
the case shall be in all respects as though such probation were under the order of said court.
(2) If he be then on probation, but not under the supervision of a local probation officer, or
if he be on parole, control of him shall be transferred to the State Board of Parole who shall
thereupon assume like control over him as though he were on parole following sentence of a
court for a maximum term provided by law for the crime for which he was committed. (3)
If he be then confined in a penal institution, the control of the Commission shall cease and
such confinement shall be upon like terms and conditions as though it had been under sentence of the court for the maximum term provided by law for the crime for which he was committed." Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1947) § 26o.I25, subd. 27. The Texas statute seems to apply
only to delinquent children-males under seventeen years and females under eighteen years
(Tex. Ann. Rev. Civ. Stat. [Vernon, Supp. 1949] art. 2338-I), and is ineffective as far as the
youth group is concerned (Tex. Ann. Rev. Civ. Stat. [Vernon, Supp. 1949] art. 5143C, § 3)The provision for termination of control is ambiguous. "Every child committed to the Council
as a delinquent, if not already discharged, shall be discharged or referred back to the [Juvenile]
court when he reaches his twenty-first birthday." Art. 5143C, § 33. Apparently there is to be
no extended contol whatsoever.
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this type of extended control may have an insidious effect. Presumably the offender was receiving corrective treatment while under the control of the
Authority, and commitment of this offender to a penitentiary may destroy all
29
the progress which has been made.

The only other alternative is that of an absolute requirement of discharge in
accordance with statutory limits.3° However, this method would be no better,
if not much worse, than the adopted provisions for extended control.
Thus, in lieu of the provision in the Model Act, those states which have
adopted youth correction legislation have chosen methods which either are
practically ineffective, or which may have an effect contrary to the philosophy
and principles underlying youth correction. This is not to say that those
statutes which have been adopted are without value; it is most probable that
the great majority of those treated by the various authorities will benefit by the
treatment. The need for extended control would only be apparent in the exceptional situation. The statutes, although departing from the Model Act in this
important respect, still contain the important ideas and methods of treatment,
and for this reason alone realize a system of youth correction which is vastly
superior to general present day methods.
At least two of the states which have adopted youth correction legislation
have made a further departure from the aims of the Model Act. It was intended
and provided by the framers of the Model Act that commitment to the Authority was to be in effect mandatory.31 Texas and Massachusetts have provided that
commitment to the Authority is discretionary and permissive.32 It is apparent
that this type of legislation is contrary to the letter and spirit of the Model Act.
Youth correction is relegated to the position of just another method of disposition available to the judge, and implies an admission by the proponents of these
acts that the present methods are acceptable. Legislation which relegates the
Youth Authority to the position of just another alternative not only condones
the present system, but indicates a lack of faith in amelioration through corrective methods. Unless all judges could be convinced of the value of youth correction, it is probable that Youth Authorities will be ineffectual in these states.
Notes 8 and 9 supra.
3o This apparently is the situation in Texas. See note 31 infra.
3z Youth Correction Authority Act (A.L.I. Official Draft, i94o) § 13. The judge was to
retain the power to sentence to death, life imprisonment or fines, if the offense was such that
these dispositions were in order.
32 Children between the ages of fourteen and seventeen against whom delinquency proceedings have been brought and dismissed, and against whom criminal proceedings subsequently are begun may be committed to the Youth Service Board, Mass. Ann. Laws (Supp.
1948) c. ii9, §§ 6i, 73, 74, 75, 76. See Section So. Section 83 provides that any boy between
fourteen and eighteen years of age may be committed. The Juvenile Court has a great many alternative dispositions at its disposal. Tex. Ann. Rev. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, Supp. 1948) art.
29

5r43C, § 12.
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It has been ten years since the Model Act was drafted and but nine years
since California became the first state to adopt youth correction legislation. It
is still much too early to determine conclusively the effect of such legislation on
the rates of youth crime and recidivism. It is not too early, however, to note
trends and discuss what has been done with the general problem of youthful
offenders and crime prevention by those states with youth correction legislation.
The reports from California present a few facts and trends which, although
inconclusive, are worthy of notice. It was expected by experts in law enforcement and allied fields that the end of the war would see a major increase in the
rate of delinquency in California, due to such factors as the great influx of persons into the state, and the extreme mobility and disorganization of its population. 3 However, contrary to these expectations, the actual increase in the rate
did not occur. From information available it appears that the actual occurrence
of delinquency approximately paralleled the increase in population.34 It is not
safe to conclude that this absolutely proves the success of youth correction, for
there might be many other causative factors. This fact does seem to indicate,
however, that state-wide mobilization of youth services might well have had a
beneficial effect in enabling California to hold the line.
Whether the California Youth Authority has been able to combat the rate of
recidivism cannot be answered at this time. If recidivism includes not only acts
committed by a youth after discharge, but also any offense committed while
under parole or probation, some definitive trends are recognizable. Crudely refined statistics indicate that of all the youthful offenders who have been placed
on parole and returned, the percentage recommitted because of new offenses has
been decreasing. In 1946, 54% of all returned from parole had perpetrated new
crimes; in 1947, 41%; and in 1948, 35.2%.35 Before any definite, over-all conclu-

sions can be drawn, considerable statistics must be accumulated and more precise methods of tracing the movements of discharged individuals must be de6

veloped.3

Despite the inconclusive statistical evidence of the effectiveness of youth correction some appraisal of the success of the various youth authorities may be
drawn from an examination of delinquency prevention on the local level, and
diagnostic treatment on the centralized correctional level.
The Youth Authority, created by the Model Act, was not limited solely to
corrective treatment after conviction; the Authority also was empowered to
33

California Youth Authority, Report of Program and Progress 148 (1948).

34 Ibid.
35

Ibid., at x49-5o.

Attention has been focused on California because it has been such a short time since
other states have passed youth correction legislation that it is even more difficult to de36

termine the effect on youth crime and recidivism in these states than in California.
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engage in programs of delinquency prevention. A practical objection which was
raised against this aspect of youth correction legislation was that the creation
of a unified program of delinquency prevention would have the effect of increasing the control of state agencies and thereby removing youth problems from the
sphere of local activity. The experience of those states with youth correction
prograiis, however, has been quite the contrary. Statutory provisions authorizing wide-spread delinquency prevention programs 37 have been effectively utilized. In the practical sphere the various authorities have been acting in an advisory and organizational capacity in developing enlightened programs of prevention and youth service, not on the central state level, but -onthe local level.38
Local detention services have been improved; subsidiary local youth agencies
have been established; law enforcement methods have been studied and improved; the youth authorities have advised and aided in the expansion of local
recreation facilities;39 community youth services have been increased, improved
and coordinated; and various local and state-wide conferences called and workshops instituted.40 Thus the various youth authorities, acting as advisers and
clearing houses for youth services, have not usurped the functions of local agencies, but rather have been the instigators of realistic and effective community
activity.
It is interesting to note that Illinois has set up statutory agencies to act in an
advisory capacity and as a central clearing house and coordinator of youth service throughout the state. 4' Should youth correction legislation be adopted in
this state the coordination of corrective and preventive activities would be a
relatively simple matter.
On the centralized correctional level, facilities for diagnosis of the youthful
offender have been established and expert staffs of social workers, psychologists
and psychiatrists have been retained. Certain shortcomings are apparent however. The Youth Authority in California has been unable to secure the full-time
services of psychiatrists, and therefore has been unable to effectuate complete
programs of diagnosis and psychiatric aid. In Minnesota, reception centers have
37 Cal. Wel. and Inst. Code (Deering, Supp. i949) §§ 1752.5, 1752.6, 1752.7; Minn. Stat.
(Mason, 1947) § 26o.i25, subd. 1,32; Wis. Stat. (Brossard, 947) §§ 54.01, 54.o6, 54.07.
38 California Youth Authority, Report of Program and Progress x4-16, 105-27 (1948).

See Youth Conservation Commission of Minnesota, The Community Organizes for Youth:
A Manual for Community Planning (1949); Division of Child Welfare, Wisconsin Dep't of
Public Welfare, Report of the Organization, Functions, and Operations of Youth Service
Activities (r95o).
39 See generally note 38 supra.

40 California and Minnesota have initiated workshops in order to train workers and teachers
on the local level. Recently the governor of Minnesota convened a general state conference on
youth in which prominent citizens and authorities participated. The recommendations made
indicate an interesting source of remedial and corrective measures. Report of Governor's State
Conference on Youth (1948).
41Ill. Rev. Stat. (1949) c. 23, §§ 22oa-22od. These provisions establish state agencies
which work together with local communities in the study and the prevention of youth crime.
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been established within the confines of prisons. This seems undesirable since
the psychological influences of prison or reformatory atmosphere may obstruct
and prevent adequate diagnosis.
The California Youth Authority has been extremely active and effective in
its program of improving present correctional institutions and establishing new
ones. Its program has been guided by the need for segregation. Offenders whose
correction programs provide for institutionalized care have been carefully
screened. Individual variables of sex, age, personality, type of offense and personal desires have determined to which of the more than ten schools or camps
the offender is to be sent. Upon commitment to an institution, an extensive fulltime program is prescribed. Vocational training varying in scope from carpentry
to dramatics is offered. Accredited elementary and high school training is given
to those individuals whose limited education would constitute an impediment
upon return to society. Adequate physical and recreational facilities are also
provided.43 Throughout the period of rehabilitative control the progress of the
individual is carefully studied, and when it is determined that sufficient progress
has been made and that the individual is fit to return to society, he is discharged.
Thus although it is not possible to appraise statistically the effects of youth
correction, and salutary effects of the concrete measures taken in California and
other states are clearly apparent.
IV
Though attempts to pass a Youth Correction Act in Illinois have failed, it is
felt that the present Illinois treatment of youthful and juvenile offenders demonstrates the need for youth correction in this state. The juvenile Court in Illinois has jurisdiction over all persons under the age of twenty-one years and may,
in proper proceedings, assume control over males under seventeen years and females under eighteen years because of delinquency.44 The court has great discretion in dealing with those individuals who have been declared neglected, dependent or delinquent.45 These is ample opportunity for disposition on an individual basis. Howevqr, the shortcomings of the system become apparent in
cases of youths charged with felonies and misdemeanors. The judge may, in his
discretion, allow a delinquent to be proceeded against in accordance with the
laws governing the commission of crimes.46 The criminal courts, moreover, have
4 California Youth Authority, Report of Program and Progress 37-40 (1948); private
correspondence with Mr. Whittier Day, Director, Minnesota Youth Conservation Commission; see Division of Child Welfare, op. cit. supra note 38.
43 California Youth Authority, Report of Program and Progress 41-98 (1948).
44 111. Rev. Stat. (1949) c. 23, §§ 190, 193, 197, 198, I99, 201.
45 Ibid., at §§ X98-203.

46Ibid., at § i9. See People v. Lattimore, 362 Ill. 2o6, 199 N.E. 275 (i935). This case
construed Section i99 to mean that the judge can exercise his discretion and refuse to take
jurisdiction and custody of a child named in a petition of delinquency.
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original jurisdiction to hear and permit prosecution for felonies notwithstanding a previous declaration of delinquency by the Juvenile Court.47 Thus, juveniles as well as the youth group48 may be subjected to criminal prosecutions, and
the resultant evils which confront the youth group after conviction.
The Illinois indeterminate sentence law allows the judge the power to fix minimum and maximum sentences within the statutory limits. The minimum must
be equal to or greater than that fixed by law, and the maximum must be equal
to or less than the statutory maximum.49 Allowing such discretion in fixing sen-

tences is utterly contrary to the idea of the indeterminate sentences ° and parole.
Especially in cases of the youthful offender, it admits the evil of varying the
sentence of individuals convicted of the same crime in accordance with varied
and irrational standards, and not in accordance with intensive diagnosis.5s The
length of a sentence in a mass treatment institution may well be one of the prime
causative factors in character and personality destruction. Youth correction and
parole were developed, in part, to avoid this consequence.
Prior to the first of this year it was within the discretion of the trial judge to
sentence even a very young offender to the state penitentiary. However, recent
enactments require all youthful male offenders under seventeen years of age to
be sentenced and committed to the Illinois State Reformatory.S2 Similar provisions exist for females under sixteen years.53 Meritorious as the intention of preventing incarceration of youthful offendersS4 with adults may be, mass treatment and lack of individual segregation are found equally in reformatories, and
in this respect a reformatory is a penitentiary for the young. Most important,
however, the group which has the highest rate of youth crime is still subject to
penitentiary sentences. The present system in Illinois is thus open to the objections motivating those who drafted the original Model Act-the youth offender
is faced with all the destructive influence inherent in punishment and penitentiary commitment.
Youth correction legislation has not fared well in Illinois, nor has there been
any legislative action on this matter since the defeat of Senate Bill 6355 in 1947.
The defeat of this legislation may have been due, hn part, to constitutional objections to youth correction generally, and Senate Bill 63 specifically.
People v. Lewis, 362 Ill. 229, igg N.E. 276 (1935).
the purposes of this note juveniles are defined as those offenders under seventeen
years of age, and youths are defined as those from seventeen to twenty-one years of age.
49 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1949) c. 38, § 802. See discussion note 17 supra.
47

48 For

sONote 17 supra.

s' See Chicago Sun-Times § i, p. 14, col. i (January 27, igso), for an excellent example of
how irrationalities may determine the length of a sentence. Where offenders are convicted of
rape, treason, murder or kidnapping, the jury (if any) is to fix a determinate sentence. Ill.
Stat. (1949) c. 38, § 8ox. In the above-mentioned article, two convicted rapists were sentenced
within ten minutes of each other. One was sentenced to ten years, the other to seventy-five.
S2 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1949) c. 38, § 803.
S4Note 51 supra.
s3 Ibid.
ss Introduced by Senator A. Marovitz.
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The constitutionality of the California Act was sustained in 1943,.6 and the
Minnesota Act was recently upheld in the case of State v. Meyer.S7 The arguments against both acts fall more or less within traditional categories of constitutional law, and are relevant since they restate the main arguments made
against proposed legislation in Illinois. In the Meyer case the defendant contended that the provision of the Act which made it mandatory upon the court
to commit the offender to the Conservation Commission,56 was a violation of the
principle of separation of powers, since the court was deprived of its "inherent
power"S9 to fix sentence. This argument was disposed of by the court since they
distinguished between those acts which are inherently judicial and those which
are judicial by legislative grant and performed within statutory limits. The pronouncement of sentence is judicial in nature, but the sentence which the court
pronounces can be, and is, determined by legislative mandate. This argument
would apparently meet with a similar fate if presented to an Illinois court. In
sustaining the validity of the indeterminate sentence law the Supreme Court of
Illinois employed reasoning similar to that of the Minnesota court. 6° In People
v. Joyce,61 it was said, "The functions of the court in regard to the punishment
are to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused, and if the determination
be one of guilt, then to pronounce the punishment or penalty prescribed by
law."
The provision for mandatory commitment to the Authority (Section 13 of
Senate Bill 63), unless the individual was initially placed on probation or sentenced to death or life imprisonment, may raise further objections. Probation
under the present Illinois Probation Act* has been construed as a matter within
the discretion of the court.6 3 Admission to probation, the termination thereof,
and the ultimate disposition of the offender, have been dealt with as an exercise
of judicial power. It may be argued that commitment to the Authority is in effect the legal equivalent of compulsory probation. The adherents of this view
maintain that the initial commitment to the Authority is a form of suspended
sentence6 4 because of the subsequent possibility of penitentiary commitment. 6s
s6 In re Herrera, 23 Cal. 2d 2o6, 143 P. 2d 345 (1943); Ex parte Ralph, 27 Cal. 2d 866, 168
P. 2d i (1944).
S7228 Minn. 286, 37 N.W. 2d 3 (1949)-

s8 Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1947) § 26o.125, subd. 13.
s9State v. Meyer, 228 Minn. 286, 37 N.W. 2d 3, 8-9 (1949).
6oPeople v. Reid, 396 Ill.592, 72 N.E. 2d 812 (1947); People v. Aikula, 357 1l. 481, 192
482, 128 N.E. 474 (1920); People v. Joyce,
N.E. 546 (1934); People v. Prochowski, 294 Ill.
124, 92 N.E. 607 (191o).
246 Ill.
X24, 135, 92 N.E. 607, 612
6z 246 Ill.

62fl1. Rev. Stat. (I949) C.38,

(1910).

§§ 784-792.

63See People v. Donovan, 376 Il. 602, 35 N.E. 2d 54 (1941); People v. Miller, 317 Ill.
33, 147 N.E. 396 (X925); cf. People v. Harrison, 392 Ill. 5Ix, 64 N.E. 2d 882 (1946).
64 Compare 11. Rev. Stat. (1949) c. 38, §§ 784, 785.
6sIll. Senate Bill 63, §§ 33-34 (i947).
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It is only the latter disposition which is described as the imposition of a sentence.
Therefore, it is concluded that although a court cannot exercise powers of probation without legislative authorization," it is quite another thing for a legislature to invade the sphere of judicial discretion and require admission to probation.
This argument relies on the assumption that commitment to the Youth
Authority would not be a judicial sentence, but rather a form of probation. This
assumption appears to be unwarranted. Senate Bill 63 provided that control of
the offender by the Authority was to terminate when the individual reached the
age of twenty-five.6 7If the Authority felt that discharge would be dangerous, it
was to allege so in a petition to the court. If the judge agreed, he was to be empowered to commit the offender to the penitentiary for a period of time equal
to the maximum sentence set by law for the offense committed, less time spent
with the Authority Such a commitment complies with the requirement that
a sentence must be definite enough to appraise the offender of his rights.6 9Commitment to the Youth Authority would be a sentence for a period of time limited
by the statutory age limits, or the maximum sentence fixed by law for such a
crime, whichever is greater. The commitment of an individual for corrective
purposes for a definite maximum period of time subsequent to conviction for a
crime is equivalent to a sentence, and is in fact a sentence. The possibility of
subsequent penitentiary incarceration is nothing more than a shift of control
under the original sentence. The fact that Senate Bill 63 made explicit provision
for the exercise of probation powers by the judge7° indicates further that commitment to the Authority is not compulsory probation. The treatment of an individual duly convicted and sentenced is not a judicial function; it is, on the
contrary, an executive function.71 Probation, as conceived and defined in the
statutes,72 is inherently different in nature and effect from the treatment of an
offender by the Youth Authority subsequent to conviction.
Consistent with the Model Act, Senate Bill 63 empowered the Authority to
7
discharge the offender when corrective therapy had been completed. 3 It is pos6
67

People v. Penn,

302 fI. 488, 135 N.E. 92 (1922).
Persons committed by the Juvenile Court were to be discharged on the twenty-first

birthday; those convicted of misdemeanor were to be discharged on the twenty-third birthday;
and those persons who were convicted of a felony and committed to the Authority were to be
Senate Bill 63, § 32
discharged on the twenty-fifth birthday. Ill.
68Ibid., at §§ 33-34.

(1947).

6People v. State Reformatory, 148 Ill. 413, 36 N.E. 76 (1894); People v. Pirfenbrink, 96
I1. 68 (188o); cf. People v. Joyce, 246 Ill. x24, 92 N.E. 607 (i9io).
70 111. Senate Bill 63, § i3 (1947).

481, 192 N.E. 546 (1934); People v. Joyce ,246 Ill.
7 Compare People v. Mlikula, 357 Ill.
124, 9 2 N.E. 607 (1go).
72 Note

64 supra.

73 l. Senate Bill 63, § 28 (1947).
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sible that such a provision would be declared unconstitutional as an unlawful
delegation of the pardoning power granted to the governor by the constitution.74 The power to parole has been described and upheld as a method of treat5
ment and not an employment of the pardoning power. 4 However, under the
present parole act there can be no final discharge of a prisoner without the concurrence of the governor. 76 Discharge, as long as conceived of as commutation
or pardon, would necessitate executive concurrence and approval. Such a requirement, if more than a rubber stamp activity, would work a hardship on
youth corrective treatment and should be avoided. The pardoning and commutation powers are based on the idea of executive clemency.7 The discharge
granted by a Youth Authority has no relation to clemency and thus no relation
to the pardoning power. Rather, it is granted as the termination of corrective
treatment and indicates that the individual is ready to go back into society. Because an executive agency can grant final discharge to a convicted offender, it
does not follow that the governor's pardoning power has been delegated or
usurped. Furthermore, Senate Bill 63 implied that the power of discharge was
8
in no way to infringe on, or affect, the scope of the executive pardon.7
The high courts of California and Minnesota both entertained argument that
laws providing a different method of treatment for youth offenders and adults
violated constitutional guarantees of due process' and equal protection. Both
courts rejected these contentions and stated that a classification which is reasonable, and in which the law affects in the same way all of those similarly situated, does not violate these constitutional prohibitions. In Illinois it has been
held consistently that classification is a matter of legislative discretion and
courts will not interfere unless the classification is clearly unreasonable and arbitrary. 79 Certainly it should not be said that a statute which provides a different means of control for individuals apprehended when under the age of twentyone than that for adults, is clearly unreasonable in light of the purpose to be
accomplished.
The objection that the power to terminate treatment and grant discharge
constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative power does not appear to be
substantial. It has long been held in Illinois that as long as the legislature prescribes the rule and standard of conduct, it may delegate various functions to an
74Ill. Const. Art. 5, § 13.

7SPeople v. Nierstheimer, 4oi Ill. 465,82 N.E. 2d 438 (1948), cert. den. 69 S. Ct. 402 (I949);
George v. People, 167 Ill. 447, 47 N.E. 741 (1897).
76111. Rev. Stat. (i949), C. 38, § 802; People v. Nierstheimer, 401 Il. 465, 82 N.E. 2d 438
(1948); George v. People, 167 Ill. 447, 47 N.E. 741 (1897). Compare People v. McKinley,
372 Ill. 247, 23 N.E. 2d 50 (1939).
77Jensen, The Pardoning Power in the American States iio et seq. (1922).
78Compare Ill. Senate Bill 63, § 37 (i947).

79Compare Berry v. City of Chicago, 320 Ill. 536,

151 N.E.

61i (I026).
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administrative agency. 0The prime requirement is that the standard of conduct
by which the agency is to guide its actions must be reasonably definite and certain.' ,
The legislative standard prescribed in the various correction acts and in Senate Bill 63 is that of public safety.12 Admittedly this is a vague standard, but the
nature of corrective activities negatives the possibility of a more definite rule of
conduct. In view of the purpose and aims of youth correction legislation, the
standard of public safety seems adequate and sufficiently certain. Only a very
conservative court would condemn such legislation as an unlawful delegation of
legislative power.
In all probability the strongest sources of opposition to youth correction legislation in Illinois are the judges who have resented any attempts to decrease
their power,13 and the local communities which resent an increase of the power
of central state agencies and a decrease of their functions in dealing with the
problem of delinquency on a local level. It is true that a youth correction act
would reduce the power of the judge over sentencing. However, in view of the
present application of the indeterminate sentence law to youthful offenders
under which sentences for identical crimes vary depending upon the whims and
irrationalities of the judge, it would appear that such a reduction in judicial
power would be highly desirable. The fear by communities of a reduced role in
delinquency prevention has not materialized. The contrary is apparent in those
states which have adopted youth correction legislation.
In view of the present disposition of youth offenders in Illinois-one which is
highly inadequate-and in view of the strides and success of youth correction
in other states, the time again is ripe for the introduction of a youth correction
act to the legislature.
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL-A BASIS FOR ENFORCEMENT OF
GOVERNMENTAL PROMISES BY THIRD PARTIES
Although a subcontractor engaged upon a building contract normally looks
first to the contractor for any compensation due him, experience has often demonstrated the practical inadequacy of this contractual remedy. The improvidence of the contractor and the lack of any contractual relationship with the
owner frequently have left the subcontractor unable to obtain compensation
either for labor and materials expended, or for damages sustained in connection
so Peoplev. Roth, 249 Ill. 532, 9 4N.E. 953 (i933). Compare Peoplev.Wilson Oil Co., 364 11.
406,4 N.E. 2d 847 (1937); Boshuizen v. Thompson and Taylor Co., 360 Ill. i6o, 195 N.E. 625
(1935); People v. Yonker, 351 Ill. 139, 184 N.E. 228 (932); People v. Beekman & Co., 347
Ill. 92, 179 N.E. 435 (1932).
st Ibid.
82 Senate Bill 63, § 28 (i947).
s3 Senator Marovitz, Transcript, Midwest Forum of the Air, April 13, 1947, p. 6 et seq.; cf.
Judge Wallace, N.Y. Times § i, p. 12, col. 6-7 (March 13, 1943).

